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As the lowcostoptions for radio traffic capture,analysisand transmissionarebecomingavailable,
somesecurityresearchershavedevelopedopensourcetoolsthatpotentiallymakeiteasiertoassess
the security of the devices that rely on radio communications without the need for extensive
knowledgeandunderstandingoftheassociatedconcepts.Recentresearchinthisareasuggeststhat
primitivevisualanalysistechniquesmaybeappliedtodecodeselectedradiosignalssuccessfully.This









is able to collect potentially valuable information through its capture and analysis (Neely,




USD, interestedradioamateursaswellas researcherswith limited fundingareable toexplore the
field of radio communications (Smith, 2012). While SDRs are theoretically able to operate on
frequencies between 55MHz and 2300MHz, with some specialised devices designed by Ossmann








Devices that operate in the subGHz range commonly include alarm systems, variousmeters and
sensors (suchasproximity,pressure,andacceleration),homeautomationsystems,remotecamera
flashes and shutter triggers, garage door openers (GDE), remote keyless entry systems (RKE), tyre
pressuremonitoringsystems (TPMS),wirelessdoorchimes, smartgrid technologycomponents for
metertoutilitycommunications,cordlessphones,mobilephones,medicaldevicesaswellasradio













While it is alsonotunusual for thedevicedesigners to turn to the2.4GHzband toachieveglobal
interoperabilitythroughtheutilisationofcommonstandardssuchasBluetooth,WLANandZigBee,








manufacturers, as it only requires a minor frequency adjustment to operate in Japan (Harney &
O’Mahony,2006). It shouldbenotedthat inAustraliasuchdevicesarealsoreferredtoas the low
interference potential devices (LIPDs), and their operation in the 433.05434.79MHz band is
supported through the relevant class licence as long as the maximum equivalent isotropically
radiatedpower(EIRP)doesnotexceed25milliwatt(mW).Historically,theadoptionofthe433MHz
band in Australia was driven in the late 1990s by the growing demand for the importation and
























Figure 1 represents the stages typically involvedwhen attempting to carry out RF replay attacks.
Essentially, theprocess commenceswith the selectionof the targetdevice. Inamoderndomestic
setting, wireless door chimes, GDEs and RKEs are typically available and present a number of
opportunitiesaspotentialtargets.

Oncethetarget is identified, theprotocolanalysisphasebegins.Thisphaseseemstobe themost
complexpartoftheprocessasitconsistsofmultiplestepsandoftenrequirestherepetitionofsome
of the steps to achieve a successful outcome, which in this contextmeans being able to reliably
decodeandretransmitthecapturedsignalsothatthetargetreactstoit.

The first stepof this phase is concernedwith the identificationof theoperating frequencyof the
selecteddevice. In theUnitedStates, the FederalCommunicationsCommission Identification (FCC
ID)labelattachedtothedeviceitselfmaybeusedtolookuptheoperatingfrequencyofthedevice
online(Weber,2013).IntheUnitedKingdom,theRadio&TelecommunicationsTerminalEquipment











The next step is to demodulate the raw signal and capture it into one of the common audio file
formats,suchasaWAVfile.TherecordingofthesignalmaybeperformedusinganSDRGUIsuchas
HDSDRorGqrx(Figure2)andalsoviathemeansofacustomGNURadioprocessingchain(Hohawk,
2012; Laurie, 2013). It shouldbenoted that,whileothermethodspotentiallyexist toachieve the
sameoutcome,thisapproachisbeingdescribedbecauseitdoesnotrequiredeepunderstandingof














waveform analysis and decomposition. Essentially, the successful decoding relies on the ability to





transmitter does not spend power when sending 0 or 1 bits depending on the specifics of the
implementation pertinent to a particular device. Interestingly, previous research suggests that
without having access to the specification of the communication protocol, it is not feasible to





wave through the process of amplification. Figure 3 shows the visual differences between the
originally captured wave and the resulting amplified square wave. Furthermore, the figure also
represents thevisual conversionprocess that isbasedonassumingthemodulationprotocolbeing
OOK. In this case, the "highs" are assumed to represent the 1 bits and the "lows" the 0 bits
respectively. Thebit lengthalso corresponds to the lengthof the shortestpulse. It shouldalsobe




the data rate (Hohawk, 2012). Given that this study is only concernedwith primitive techniques,
othermodulationschemes,suchasfrequencyshiftkeying(FSK),areconsideredtobeoutofscope.























replaywilloccuron the firstattempt,atwhichpoint steps3 to6willneed tobe repeateduntil a
successfulreplaytakesplace.Finally,toeasethesubsequentreplays,onemaychoosetoautomate
the steps required to configure thedongleand send the signalbywritinga customPythonscript.
Interestingly, the eZ430Chronos wireless development kit may also be used to carry out the
transmission and there is an opensource tool available that aids with programming the watch
(Laurie,2013).

Using the process based on themethodology described above, a number of security researchers
havebeensuccessful incarryingoutreplayattacksagainstawirelessdoorchime,remotegateand
garage door opener, automotive remote car entry systems and a wireless power saver adaptor
(Hohawk, 2012; Laurie, 2013). In the latter case, the consequences could be as dire as setting a
residentialpropertyonfire,whichwouldbelikelytoresultinextensivepropertydamage,injuryor




Theopensourceproject that facilitatesRFbasedsecurityresearchcalledRfCat isdubbedthe"the
Swiss army knife of subGHz radio" (Atlas, 2012a). The project has undergone a phase of active
developmentbymultiplecontributorsoverthelasttwoyearswiththelastchangecommittedinMay





 Texas InstrumentseZ430Chronoswirelessdevelopment kit (specifically, theCC1111based
USBaccesspoint)

In addition, a custom electronic badge has been specifically designed and built to support RfCat
(Ossmann,2012).Whiletheprojectdocumentationcontainsadetailedsetofinstructionsonloading
thefirmwareontothesupporteddevice,theinteractiveshellissparselydocumentedandsuccessful








Figure4presents the screenshotof the interactiveRfCat shell that is shown immediatelyupon its





















securityresearch.Thepresentedabilityto listentoradiotraffic inreal timeandhavethedecoded
datapresentedonscreen instringformcouldpotentiallyeliminatetheneedforthetediousvisual
protocol decomposition process and speed up the signal decoding phase by multiple orders of
magnitude.Ultimately,theintentionbehindthetoolwastoimplementameansofconvenientaccess
tothesubGHzspectrum,sothatsecurityconcernsassociatedwithradiocommunicationsprotocols
























































employ sophisticated security mechanisms, such as RKEs (Aerts et al., 2012). The operating
frequencyofthedevicewasinitiallydiscoveredbyvisuallyinspectingthechimecomponentcase,as
itwasconvenientlyprovidedontheattachedlabel.Subsequently,tuningtheSDRtothediscovered







tobeAM.At that stage, the frequencyvalueandmodulationschemeprovidedsufficientbasis for
signal capture. Once the signalwas captured, itwas established that the demodulatedwaveform
comprisedofabout60shortbursts,allofwhichwereidentical.Atthispoint,duetothesimplicityof








expected by the device. The length of the required whitespace was determined in an iterative
manner tobe3NULLbytes.Finally, sending thedecodedbinaryvalueof“\x12\xD9\x65\x96\xD9”




bursts also resulted in a successful replay.While subsequent automationwas out of scope of the
study, one could potentially create a script to brute force the associated signal key space to





based on visual signal analysis. In the context of simple devices that utilise the OOKmodulation
scheme,thepresentedmethodologyhasbeenverifiedtobesuccessfulandprovesthatcarryingout
simpleRFreplayattacksdoesnotrequiresubstantialknowledgeofradiocommunications.Thestudy
has shown that a lowcost SDR coupled with a USB dongle compatible with the RfCat firmware





complex communication protocols could be analysed in greater detail to derive additional and
potentiallymoreefficientdecodingtechniques.Forexample,conversionofwavepulsesintobinary
and hexadecimal representations could be automated using a custom script. Secondly, RF signals
could potentially be used in locational fingerprinting. Thirdly, the features of RfCat that facilitate
automatedsignaldiscoveryanddecodingwithouttheneedforvisualwaveforminspectioncouldbe
studied in more detail. Finally and most importantly, research into ways of securing weak radio
communicationprotocolscouldassistwithprotectingthesubGHzspectrumfrompotentialattacks
inthefuture.
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